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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, various litigants attempted to convince United
States courts that international norms relating to the death penalty have an
important bearing on the legality of certain execution practices, particularly
juvenile execution.' The results have not been all that we wished for, but
there have been distinct gains. A plurality of the Supreme Court held in
Thompson v. Oklahoma2 that the execution of persons below the age of
sixteen violates the Eighth Amendment, relying in part upon international
practice and normative instruments.3 Thompson survives as precedent,
continuing to mandate reversal of death sentences imposed on some young
offenders.4
But in Stanford v. Kentucky,5 a different plurality of the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment for those aged sixteen or
seventeen at the time of the crime, pointedly rejecting the relevance of both
international norms and comparative practice to Eighth Amendment
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., Rice University; J.D., Harvard Law
School; Diploma in Law, Oxford University.
1 E.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International, Brief for Amicus Curiae
International Human Rights Law Group, Brief for Amicus Curiae Defense for Children
International - USA, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 86-6169); Brief for
Amicus Curiae Amnesty International, Brief for Amicus Curiae International Human Rights
Law Group, Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (consolidated with and decided sub
nom. Stanford V. Kentucky) (Nos. 87-5765, 87-6026); Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty
International, State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1993) (No. 57003-5).
2 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
' 487 U.S. at 830-31 and n.34 (citing data drawn from amicus curiae brief of Amnesty
International and study by Library of Congress staff).
" Flowers v. State, 586 So. 2d 978 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (relying on Thompson to
reverse death sentence imposed on defendant aged fifteen; Alabama law provides no
minimum age for execution, and children as young as fourteen may be tried as adults).
' 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
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jurisprudence.6 Post-Stanford courts have begun to treat the issue of
juvenile execution with bored indifference.' While there have been some
recent successful attacks on capital sentences for older juveniles, these cases
have turned upon interpretations of unclear state statutes,8 rather than
constitutional limits or international norms.9 As a result, state legislatures
remain apparently free to reimpose the death penalty on older juveniles.'0
International concern with the death penalty has not been limited to
juvenile execution. A number of distinct issues have been addressed at the
international level, including exemptions for other classes of offenders
(pregnant women and persons aged over seventy), restriction of the death
penalty to the "most serious crimes," procedural protections such as a right
to appeal or eligibility for clemency, long delays on death row pending
execution, the torturous character of some modes of execution, as well as the
6 492 U.S. at 369 n.1 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion):
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici
... that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant.
The four dissenters who had constituted the plurality in Thompson (Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens) continued to rely on comparative practice and international
instruments. Id. at 389-90.
'See, e.g., Wright v. Virginia, 427 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1993); Hain v. Oklahoma, 852 P.2d
744, (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
8 State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092, 1102 (Wash. 1993) (in absence of any statutory
minimum age for execution, age eighteen is presumptive minimum; offenders as young as
eight could be tried as adults); State v. Bey (I), 548 A.2d 846, 873 (N.J. 1988) (1986
amendment setting age of execution at eighteen applied retroactively to seventeen-year-old
offender, court determining that legislature of New Jersey never intended juveniles to be
death-eligible under 1982 law that set no minimum age).
' The Washington Supreme Court made no reference in State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092
(Wash. 1993), to the amicus curiae brief filed by Amnesty International detailing international
norms and execution patterns relating to juvenile offenders. See supra note 1.
0 Moreover, Justice O'Connor's crucial concurrence in Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833, 848-
49 (1988), excluded the death penalty only for offenders under the age of sixteen in states
whose legislatures had never specifically set a minimum age for execution. Given the current
hysteria over youth crime, the risk of new legislation setting very young ages for death-
eligibility cannot be dismissed. See, e.g., 4 Florida Teenagers Charged in Killing of Tourist,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (Florida thirteen-
year-old charged with capital crime; Attorney General states that Florida will not execute
anyone under age of sixteen but will not interfere in prosecution); Jolayne Houtz, Hardened
kids doing harder time for crimes, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 2, 1994, at Al (increase in number
of juveniles standing trial as adults in Washington State from 101 in 1992 to 157 in 1993).
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overarching question of abolition."
With respect to issues other than juvenile execution, there is little evidence
of alertness or receptivity to the international dimension of capital punish-
ment even among American jurists critical of existing execution practices.
Justice Blackmun's passionate denunciation in Callins v. Collins2 of the
constitutionality of capital punishment within our flawed justice system
makes no reference to the anomalous position occupied by the United States
in comparison to other economically advanced and democratic nations.
Judge Reinhardt's learned dissent on the constitutionality of hanging as a
mode of execution ranges widely through historical sources, asserting that
judges may utilize the "tools of philosophy, religion, logic and history, in an
effort to obtain a full understanding of the nature of a civilized society."' 3
But except for one closing reference to the rejection of hanging by "most
other nations" and "the rest of the civilized world,"'14 Judge Reinhardt limits
his discussion of the international dimension of the issue to two brief
mentions of practice in "the English speaking world."' 5
Why have American courts assessing the legality of capital punishment
largely been impervious to the international aspect of the questions
confronting them? At least three possibilities suggest themselves: (1) our
theories of customary law in the death penalty area have been flawed and
therefore deservedly unconvincing; (2) our theories have been valid but our
advocacy has been deficient; or (3) our theories have been valid and our
advocacy has been appropriate, but the courts have rejected or ignored both
because of the peculiar political sensitivity of capital punishment.
" See generally Joan Fitzpatrick & Alice Miller, International Standards on the Death
Penalty: Shifting Discourse, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 273 (1993); WILLIAM ScHABAs, THE
ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993); ROGER HOOD, THE
DEATH PENALTY (1989).
12 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 697 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
14 Id. at 717.
" Id. at 697 (noting that in 1981 only four jurisdictions in the English-speaking world,
three U.S. states and South Africa, retained hanging); and at 700 (noting that only South
Africa and a few small Caribbean states had carried out judicial hangings in the English-
speaking world since 1966).
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II. Is THERE ANY CUSTOMARY LAW RELATING TO THE
JUDICIAL DEATH PENALTY?
In this discussion, I will limit myself to the judicial death penalty, leaving
aside genocide and summary execution, though some of the attacks upon the
concept of customary international human rights law place those prohibitory
norms in doubt as well. Simma and Alston 6 see a peculiar American
pathology at work in over-generous claims for the existence of customary
human rights norms by both scholars and litigants in recent years. We have
allegedly manifested solipsism (or "normative chauvinism") 7 in defining
fundamental human rights identically to the U.S. Bill of Rights," and have
unwittingly been swept up by the American impulse to export our prescrip-
tive and adjudicatory authority outside U.S. territorial bounds.' 9
Of our efforts to question the international legality of American death
penalty practices, we can plead innocent on both charges. Juvenile execution
serves as an excellent vehicle for exploring the general problem of the
enforceability of customary human rights law in U.S. courts precisely
because it concerns an arguable customary human rights norm not yet clearly
reflected in the Constitution, with respect to which the major violations are
occurring right here at home.2' When a series of actual death sentences
against juvenile offenders came under attack in domestic courts and the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),2' U.S. human
rights activists accepted the challenge to put theory into practice.
22
An interesting parallel exists between the Eighth Amendment concept of
16 Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992).
17 Id. at 94.
18 Id. at 94-95.
'9 Id. at 86 (describing "the famous Filartiga jurisprudence" as "one of the few more
likeable facets of the omnipresent tendency of U.S. courts to usurp jurisdiction beyond
limits").
20 Amnesty International's data at the time Wilkins v. Missouri, supra note 1, was briefed,
indicated that only eight juveniles had been judicially executed between 1979 and 1988.
Three of those executions took place in the United States; the remainder occurred in Pakistan
(two), Barbados, Bangladesh and Rwanda. Brief, supra note 1, at 30.
21 In addition to the cases listed in note 1, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights decided a petition filed on behalf of James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton in 1987.
Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 61, OEA/Ser.L./VJII.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
22 See supra, note 1.
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"evolving standards of decency"23 and the customary law requisites of state
practice and opinio juris. Both require proof of purposive acts or absten-
tions. The chief benchmark for application of the Eighth Amendment to
constrain legislative discretion is the "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."2' These "evolving standards" are
measured primarily by reference to the penal practices of the states of the
American union, adopted out of a conscious effort to avoid cruelty. The
Eighth Amendment elements of practice and consciousness are roughly
analogous to the state practice and opinio juris elements of customary law
(though lacking the requisite that the consciousness be directed outward
toward peer states).
Justice Scalia emphasized in Stanford2s that "objective" factors should
dominate Eighth Amendment analysis, just as actual state practice should
dominate determinations of customary law.26 But Scalia's narrow focus on
explicit, prohibitory state laws counts only conscious acts of abstention
taking the form of positive legal obligation.27 Similarly restrictive claims
that penal practices "count" towards formation of a customary norm only
when they are undertaken in conscious regard for other nations' seem to
collapse the practice and opinio juris elements of customary law.
Scalia' s error is illustrated by his miscounting of Washington State among
the jurisdictions approving the execution of juvenile offenders. 29 Under
Scalia's approach, Washington technically counts as a jurisdiction that
approves the execution of eight-year-olds, since its legal minimum age for
trial as an adult is eight and its death penalty statute prescribes no separate
minimum age.' °  To rely on such inadvertent legislative drafting to
categorize Washington as a jurisdiction whose ethos sanctions the official
killing of small children is absurd. A recent interpretive ruling by the
' Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion).
IId.
2 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
2 See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. I. INT'L
L. 101 (1987).
17 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71.
n Simma & Alston, supra note 16, at 96, 99-100.
29 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.2 (not including Washington on list of states precluding
capital punishment for those under age eighteen at the time of the crime).
30 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.04.050 (1992) (permitting trial as adult by children as young
as eight); § 10.95.070 (1992) (specifying the mitigating factors for capital punishment,
including "the age of a defendant," but setting no minimum age for execution).
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Washington Supreme Court sets a minimum age of eighteen for execution
under these ambiguous statutes.3
Evidentiary issues relating to customary law and to the Eighth Amendment
raise a fundamental question-why should the purposive acts of a large
majority of states in rejecting a certain penal practice constrain, through
enforceable legal norms, the discretion of other states inclined to pursue a
more draconian approach? And should the fact that a particular state,
perhaps rather belatedly, chooses to depart from the predominant and more
humane practice, lead to the conclusion either that no norm ever existed, or,
alternatively, that the nonconforming state is entitled to exemption from the
norm as a persistent objector?
Despite the difficulty in determining what practice counts, proof of an
international penal norm must begin with state practice. This is as true in
the death penalty area as it was in the Lotus case.32 Abstentions constitute
the state practice element of prohibitory penal norms. In the death penalty
and most other human rights contexts, this practice is "dense," consisting of
literally millions of actual and potential penal acts. In the Lotus case, the
universe of pertinent incidents consisted of four municipal decisions, after the
Permanent Court of International Justice had rejected on relevancy grounds
some of the more general jurisdictional arguments made by France.33 As
two of the relevant cases were consistent and two were inconsistent with the
France's postulated norm of non-prosecution, the Court was not convinced
that a customary norm had been proven.'
France's poor showing in the Lotus case may have been the result of
faulty advocacy or of a dearth of relevant practice. Possibly it is a rare event
for a collision-causing ship's officer to enter the national territory of his
victims shortly after a collision, thereby potentially subjecting himself to the
reach of that state's criminal courts. But the advantage to France in the
Lotus case was that, if it had been able to prove a consistent practice of non-
prosecution, that pattern would have been very telling. Consistent absten-
tions from prosecution in such circumstances, despite serious injuries to
' State v. Furman, 858 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1993).
32 S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7, 1927).
33 Id. at 22-31.
3 Id. Professor Weisburd reads the Lotus case as standing for the proposition that
contrary state practice defeats an asserted customary norm. Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary
International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 32-35 (1988).
But a case in which half the discoverable incidents of state practice contradict the proposed
norm need not stand for a such a categorical principle.
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nationals and opportunity to prosecute, strongly suggest the operation of an
international prohibitory norm. Explanatory diplomatic correspondence or
other direct evidence of motivation would help satisfy the element of opinio
juris, but would not be strictly necessary for proof of relevant state practice.
But patterns of abstention do not always speak for themselves.35
Sometimes they can be understood as carrying normative significance only
by reference to explicit statements of principle. These statements may take
the form of codification in treaties or expression in the "soft law" of General
Assembly resolutions. Simma and Alston acknowledge that "the existence
vel non of a rule of international customary law not requiring interaction, and
not really running between States, can only be ascertained by finding
expressions of a respective international opinio juris."6 For Simma and
Alston, this signifies not a special character of customary law formation in
the human rights field but a fatal flaw, since opinio juris would then
i'count' . . twice, 37 and, even worse, be "the only relevant element,, 38
completely displacing practice. They suggest that since human rights norms
generally lack "this element of interaction ... [and do] not 'run between'
States in any meaningful sense," recognizing them does "violence... to the
established formal criteria of custom."'39
But what about those "formal criteria of custom"? They are not as
immutable as the skeptics suggest. Thejus gentium, based on a combination
of natural law precepts and interactions among a diverse group of actors,
including but not strictly limited to nation-states, was superseded in the
nineteenth century by state-centered positivist concepts of customary law.4
Why should we be frozen in that century-old mode? Customary law should
adapt itself to the new realities of the human rights era. In this era, a state's
steps to protect the basic dignity of its own nationals cannot always plausibly
be explained as having been taken in complete disregard to potential
international legal responsibility.
For example, presume that over a ten-year period retentionist states almost
" Simma and Alston observe that "[a]bstentions per se mean nothing; they become
meaningful only when considered in the light of the intention motivating them." Supra note
16, at 103-04.
6 Id. at 100.
7 Id. at 96.
I d. at 100.
Id. at 99.
o See generally, Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources and Evidences of
Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147 (1995-96).
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uniformly abandon hanging as a mode of execution. If some of those states
have substituted stoning and beheading for hanging, we would not conclude
that a customary anti-hanging norm had emerged. If serious crime had
miraculously disappeared from the face of the earth, leaving no practical
scope for the employment of the noose, postulating an international anti-
hanging norm would likewise be questionable.
But assume instead a situation of continuing high rates of serious crime,
accompanied by the systematic substitution of more humane methods of
execution for hanging. This pattern of state behavior could very well be the
material expression of a common normative consciousness that hanging is
excessively cruel and inimical to basic human dignity. Even though this
pattern of practice lacks inherent elements of state interaction, our theories
of customary law formation should be sufficient to assess when and if it is
the material manifestation of an emergent norm.
The failure to codify actual death sentencing patterns into national law has
sometimes been seen as disproving the existence of a customary norm.4"
For instance, with respect to juvenile execution, despite highly consistent
sentencing patterns, 42 national laws do not uniformly adopt the precise age
of eighteen as the threshold of death-eligibility.43 And for Justice Scalia,
the textual diversity of state death penalty laws was fatal to proof that
juvenile execution had become "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
Amendment.'
4' A student note on the Stanford case asserts that "[elven today, 61 countries that impose
the death penalty in practice do not distinguish juveniles from adult offenders." Laura Dalton,
Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of an Emerging Rule of
Customary International Law, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 161, 192 n.257 (1990). The author
proposes, as a condition for the recognition of a customary international norm establishing a
minimum age of eighteen for execution, the following proof:
[Tihe only legitimate way to explore the creation of a rule of customary
international law that would prohibit the juvenile death penalty is to
determine the practices of nations prior to the creation of the American,
European, or African conventions on human rights in order to establish
a consistent state practice coupled with opinio juris and, in addition, to
look to the practices of the nations presently uninvolved in the treaties or
with reservations to the death penalty clauses to prove sufficient universal
compliance to establish the norm as a rule of customary international law.
Id. at 192.
42 Brief for Amnesty International, supra note 1.
"3 Dalton, supra note 41.
"Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989). In contrast, the majority of the
Ninth Circuit that upheld the constitutionality of hanging denigrated the proof that all but two
states had by legislation officially repudiated the practice of hanging as excessively cruel.
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Yet it is not obvious why legal texts should carry so much more weight
than actual sentencing practices. It is true that legal texts in general are
easier to discover than sentencing decisions. But, unlike many other penal
practices that are potentially subject to customary norms, the death penalty
is a well-studied subject for which rather good data are available. 45  It
seems that something more than the quality of the empirical data concerns
the critics who demand explicit and universal codification as a prerequisite
to recognition of a prohibitory norm in the human rights field.
Indeed, for the skeptics, neither practice alone nor codification alone
satisfies the state practice prong of customary law. The norm against torture,
for example, is highly codified in national law, but frequently breached.'
Skeptics such as Weisburd, Simma and Alston conclude that this inconsistent
practice disproves the existence of any customary norm against torture.47
For other scholars, the fact that acts of torture are typically denied by
guilty governments and are virtually never inflicted under a claim of right
means that the contrary practice does not disprove the norm, but only
establishes that the norm is often breached.4 Breaches of the norm against
torture lack a normative dimension because of the absence of accompanying
claims of right. Acts of torture, genocide or summary execution can be
contrasted, for example, to breaches accompanied by new claims of right,
that over time and with increasing acquiescence create new norms. Perhaps,
then, the real significance of uniform codification of a penal practice in
national law is that departures from the law by rights-abusing state officials
will generally not be accompanied by claims of right. As a consequence,
breaches of the norm should neither disprove the norm's existence nor lead
to the evolution of a replacement norm.
In the case of juvenile execution, unlike torture, hypocrisy is not the key
While these statutes reflected "public perception," they cast no light on the "actual pain"
inflicted by hanging, which the majority adopted as its Eighth Amendment benchmark.
Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
4- In addition to the data compiled by Amnesty International, supra note 1, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations conducts periodic surveys of death penalty practices. See, e.g.,
Capital Punishment: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., Agenda Item
1, U.N. Doc. E/1990/38/Rev.1 (1990).
46 AmNETY INmrRNATiONAL, TORTuRE IN THE EiGrriEs (1984).
47 Weisburd, supra note 34, at 32-35; Simma & Alston, supra note 16, at 96-98.
4s Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L L.
J. 53, 79-82 (1981).
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problem since actual practice is very consistent though the laws on the
subject are facially diverse. But the United States is a key dissenting actor,
both de facto and de jure, on the international death penalty scene. It is
striking that U.S. representatives did not dissent on principled grounds at the
time of the codification of the norm in human rights treaties. 9 When
President Carter sent the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the American Convention on Human Rights to the Senate for ratifica-
tion, the State Department testified that juvenile execution was a practice
never engaged in by the United States.5° While that statement was true at
the time (shortly after the de facto moratorium on the death penalty was
lifted in the post-Gregg era),5 ' events have overcome us and juvenile
execution has become an unfortunate reality in the American experience.
Simma and Alston might conclude that no juvenile execution norm ever
emerged, because the practice was always too equivocal and not sufficiently
other-state-regarding even when it seemed uniform. In comparison, the
IACHR suggested that the United States was a persistent objector to an
emerging norm against juvenile execution.52 I am puzzled by those who
find that state practice to constitute a norm must be internationally conscious,
but who carve out exceptions for non-conforming states who never (or only
belatedly) express principled disagreement with the norm. If supporting
practice must be purposive and accompanied by opiniojuris, it is hard to see
why the mere fact of inconsistent practice should create an exception,
especially where that practice occurs after the crystallization of the norm.53
Another problem in invoking international standards relating to the death
penalty is that many are vague or aspirational, such as the increasingly
49 See Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International
Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655, 682-86
(1983).
o International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1979) (Response by the Department of State to the
"Critique of Reservations to the International Human Rights Covenants" by the Lawyers
Committee for International Human Rights).
51 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
52 Roach and Pinkerton decision, supra note 21, 1 54 (finding protest in the general
reservation proposed to Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights by Carter
Administration in December 1977).
53 Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.l. 9, 36-37
(1982).
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fragile consensus on eventual worldwide abolition.' This makes interna-
tional death penalty norms difficult to evoke effectively in litigation. Lack
of clarity concerning the minimum age of execution inhibited the IACHR
from recognizing a customary prohibition on execution of offenders under
the age of eighteen in the Roach and Pinkerton case, for example.55
It is tempting to attack the problem of vagueness by reference to more
precise treaty norms. Scholars and activists have been criticized for overly
heavy reliance on treaty norms to prove customary human rights law.'
Perhaps we have not been clear enough in distinguishing the two distinct
roles that treaty provisions might play in proving the existence of a
customary norm.
First is the still controversial theory that treaty provisions can themselves
be counted among the relevant state practice for proof of a parallel
customary norm binding non-parties.5" If over one hundred states have
made a solemn commitment not to execute juveniles, a commitment they
honor in practice, does their practice "count" toward the proof of a parallel
customary norm? Or should their practice be excluded because their
abstention from juvenile execution can only be understood as adherence to
their treaty commitments? If only the practice of non-parties counts, then as
human rights treaties become more widely ratified, non-conforming, non-
ratifying states will find it increasingly easy to prevent the recognition of
customary human rights norms. If one believes in a purely consent-based
system of customary law, premised on universal adherence, this prospect will
not be troubling.58 But the end result is that we will have customary norms
only where we have no need for them. 9
The second potential role of treaties in the formation of customary law is
as a source of explanation for the states parties' compliance with the norm.
Sometimes the terms or drafting history of a human rights treaty characterize
its provisions as a codification of an already-existent customary norm. When
dealing with penal practices that primarily affect a state's own nationals, it
is often difficult to demonstrate that even a highly consistent practice of
abstention is best understood as adherence to a customary norm.
s' See generally Fitzpatrick & Miller, supra note 11.
55 Roach and Pinkerton decision, supra note 21, 1 60.
'6 See Weisburd, supra note 34.
57 ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1971).
58 Weisburd, supra note 34, at 42-45.
s Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 48, at 82.
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Let us assume, for example, that we have conclusive proof that pregnant
women and infants are never executed anywhere in the world. This pattern
might be explained by the fact that they never commit capital crimes, so the
occasion of their execution simply never arises. Or, it might be that in each
state a distinct cultural value has led state authorities, pursuing widely
divergent normative paths, to reach the identical conclusion that such persons
should not be death-eligible. Or, alternatively, state authorities might have
been animated by a common, universal revulsion against the cruelty and
indignity of execution of such persons. The codification of an exemption
from execution for such persons in a major human rights treaty might serve
a valuable evidentiary function in explaining that the observable but
ambiguous pattern of state behavior was motivated by a shared consciousness
that to act otherwise would be to fall beneath minimal standards of civilized
behavior, imbuing the domestic penal practice with an international
dimension.
Juries, prosecutors and legislatures are unlikely to characterize their
conduct in international terms, even where it conforms perfectly to a
postulated international norm. The codification of a prohibition in multilater-
al treaties supplies otherwise unavailable evidence that a particular penal
practice is eschewed out of international concern and obligation.
Relying on treaty obligations to supply proof of opinio juris triggers the
same objections discussed above concerning use of treaty provisions to
supply evidence of consistent state practice.' The attitude of states
conforming to the asserted customary norm is crucial to the formation of
customary law, not the attitude of states accepting the conventional
obligation. But while empirical data may sometimes be available to prove
a consistent penal practice among non-ratifying states, it will be the rare case
indeed where any direct evidence of a consciousness of international legal
obligation will exist in relation to domestic penal practices, with the
exception of Lotus-type situations where the crime creates an international
incident.
But why must we rely on the terms or drafting history of human rights
treaties, or on General Assembly resolutions, for proof of opiniojuris? Why
not locate opinio juris in protest or forceful countermeasures against non-
conforming practice? The sad reality is that, at best, protest is likely to be
verbal and unlikely to be widespread. Mother Theresa, the Pope and two
o Weisburd, supra note 34; Dalton, supra note 41.
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million Italians protested the death sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old
Paula Cooper,61 but no state took forceful countermeasures, imposed
economic sanctions or severed diplomatic relations over the case. The
skeptics draw the conclusion that no norm exists. I suggest that customary
law formation in the human rights field cannot reasonably be premised on
the willingness of third party states to intervene forcefully to protect victims.
Simma and Alston have raised important questions as to whether our focus
on customary law has been misplaced, when we should have been attempting
to establish general principles of law, or, alternatively, natural-law-based
norms of jus cogens that avoid the difficulties of consistent practice and
consent.62 They concede at least a customary human rights norm of a droit
de regard, permitting diplomats in intergovernmental organizations to
criticize each other without interfering in domestic sovereignty. '  While
this seems cold comfort to human rights activists, well-aware that human
rights principles are easily sacrificed by diplomats on the altar of expediency,
a droit de regard is not without some significance in relation to the death
penalty. Capital punishment has been discussed as a human rights issue at
least since the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but
recent years have seen an increasingly aggressive posture by retentionist
states, including the United States, attempting to shut off discussion of the
death penalty on both domestic sovereignty and cultural relativity grounds.'
Thus, establishing even so much as a droit de regard in the death penalty
context must be counted as something of a victory.
But neither a droit de regard nor a general principle of law is likely to
save the lives of the juveniles on death row. Only a domestically enforce-
able norm will have that material impact.
III. STRATEGIC CHOICES IN LITIGATING THE LEGALITY OF
JUVENILE EXECUTION
The two basic options for challenging the legality of juvenile execution in
courts of the United States are: (1) proof of a customary norm of interna-
tional law that invalidates contrary state law under the Supremacy Clause;
61 Lisa Kline Arnett, Comment, Death at an Early Age: International Law Arguments
Against the Death Penalty for Juveniles, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 255 (1988).
62 Simma & Alston, supra note 16.
63 Id. at 98-99.
64 Fitzpatrick & Miller, supra note 11.
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or (2) reliance on an international norm against juvenile execution to
interpret the "Cruel and Unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment.6' Both arguments were made, for example, in the Stanford case."6
The customary law approach has the advantage of simplicity and the
benefit of the historical recognition of customary law as an enforceable
source of law in United States courts.6 ' But the strengths of the customary
law strategy are undermined by three detriments.
First, this approach hinges on satisfying all the theoretical objections to the
existence of customary norms discussed in Section II above. Second,
successful pursuit of this approach requires establishing a hierarchy between
customary international law and state statutes. While the logic of such a
hierarchy under the Supremacy Clause is clear, little direct precedent can be
found to support it.6 Third, courts skeptical of the legal nature of custom-
ary law are likely to be highly disinclined to give it dispositive force in the
face of contrary law adopted by domestic political actors, even if relevant
precedent directs them to do so. 69
The Eighth Amendment interpretive approach has a number of merits,
especially the lack of need to satisfy the technical requirements for proving
a customary norm. The dearth of juvenile death sentences outside the United
States speaks for itself with regard to the "unusual" nature of the practice.
Until Justice Scalia's pugnacious parochialism in Stanford,70 the Supreme
Court had indicated a willingness to include a canvass of comparative
practices among the relevant data in assessing what the "evolving standards
of decency" entail.7 ' The treaties likewise serve as pertinent reference
points by defining, with admirable precision, contemporary international
standards of decency, without any need for proof of their binding effect on
65 See Hartman, supra note 49.
See supra note 1.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
"RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(1),
cmt. d and nn.2,3 (1987).
(Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nomL Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). Given the exclusive authority of federal executive
officials over foreign policy, it is unlikely that state officials would be found to have engaged
in a "controlling executive act" that precludes the application of customary international law.
See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
70 See 492 U.S. at 369.
71 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 n.4. 596 n.10 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982).
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the United States.
But the short shrift given to international practice and treaty norms even
by the Thompson plurality72 signals the flaws in this approach. Without
proof that the rejection of juvenile execution elsewhere in the world imposes
a binding legal obligation on the United States, there is no compelling reason
for U.S. courts to give these data prominence in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment.
Whether customary or treaty norms should control the interpretation of the
Constitution raises interesting issues. In the case of a clear conflict between
a constitutional provision and a customary or treaty norm, precedent suggests
that the Constitution would control.73
Where constitutional norms are vague (as in the Eighth Amendment
context), the interpretive principle of The Charming Betsy comes into
play.74 The Charming Betsy principle is premised on the attribution of an
internationally law-abiding character to the law-giver whose unclear
enactments are at issue.75  Eighth Amendment "evolving standards of
decency" in an increasingly interdependent world call for a cosmopolitan
rather than parochial approach.
Although the United States Constitution lacks an explicit provision similar
to that of Article 25 of the German Basic Law, assimilating international
customary norms into national law,76 there are strong reasons to interpret
unclear constitutional provisions so as to be consistent with international
norms where possible. Not only does this approach help insure the interna-
tional law-abiding character of the United States, it helps avoid a clash
between two important interpretive principles-that statutes should be
72 Justice Stevens referred to the views of "other nations that share our Anglo-American
heritage" and "leading members of the Western European community," as well as to "three
major human rights treaties [that] explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties." Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 and n.34 (1988) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(3)
(1987); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Black, J., plurality opinion).
74 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); Ralph G. Steinhardt,
The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1103 (1990).
7s For a particularly clear exposition of this principle, see Chew Heong v. United States,
112 U.S. 536 (1884).
76 Simma & Alston, supra note 16, at 86 (indicating that German courts are prevented by
Article 25 of the German Basic Law from interpreting and applying German law in a manner
violating general rules of international law).
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construed, where possible, to be consistent with the Constitution' and with
international law.78 As the Supreme Court has noted,79 both rules have
their roots in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in The Charming Betsy.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF THE JUDGES
To some observers, efforts to gain recognition for the binding legal nature
of customary human rights norms through litigation on the death penalty
may have been a quixotic undertaking. The federal courts have been
progressively deregulating state death penalty regimes by constricting the
substantive scope of Eighth Amendment rights and systematically precluding
review on federal habeas corpusW0 It was unlikely that, simultaneously,
those courts would have placed the American death penalty system under the
governance of international law, even with respect to such a relatively
peripheral issue as juvenile execution.
The sad fact is that the death penalty in the United States has little to do
with penology and little to do with law. It is politics, and symbolic politics
at that."1 Even with perfectly coherent theories of customary law formation
and brilliant advocacy, our chances of success would have been slim.
Whether these political realities should have inhibited our advocacy is a
matter for personal judgment.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979).
78 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
79DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988).
so See Vivian Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent
Proposals to Reform Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665 (1990);
Stephen P. Garvey, Note, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J, 187 (1991); Joseph L.
Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
1989 Sup. Cr. REv. 165; Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305.
S See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING AND GORDON HAwKINs, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
AMERICAN AGENDA (1986).
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